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Abstract. We show how group discounts can be offered without forcing
buyers to surrender their anonymity, as long as buyers can use their own
computing devices (e.g. smartphone, tablet or computer) to perform a
purchase. Specifically, we present a protocol for privacy-preserving group
discounts. The protocol allows a group of buyers to prove how many they
are without disclosing their identities. Coupled with an anonymous pay-
ment system, this makes group discounts compatible with buyer privacy
(that is, buyer anonymity).
Keywords: Buyer privacy, Group discounts, Cryptographic protocols,
Digital signatures
1 Introduction
Group discounts are offered by vendors to encourage consumers to use
their services, to promote more efficient use of resources, to protect the en-
vironment, etc. Examples include group tickets for museums, stadiums or
leisure parks, discounted highway tolls or parking fees for high-occupancy
vehicles, etc. It is common for the vendor to require all group members
to identify themselves, but in reality this is seldom strictly necessary.
We make the assumption that the important feature about the group
is the number of its members, rather than their identities. A secondary
feature that may often (not always) be relevant for a group discount is
whether group members are physically together.
Anonymously proving the number of group members and their being
together is trivial in a face-to-face setting with a human verifier, who
can see that the required number of people are present. However, with
an automatic verifier and/or in an on-line setting, this becomes far from
obvious.
In this paper, we propose a method to prove the number of people in
a group while preserving the anonymity of group members and without
requiring specific dedicated hardware, except for a computing device with
some wireless communication capabilities (e.g. NFC, Bluetooth or WiFi).
Also, we explore the option to include payment in our proposed system,
which is necessary for group discounts. We complete the description of our
method with a possible anonymous payment mechanism, scratch cards.
The method presented here is a generalization of a specific protocol for toll
discounts in high-occupancy vehicles, whose patent we recently filed [6].
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes
the building blocks of our method, namely a digital signature scheme,
a key management scheme, an anonymous payment scheme and wireless
communication technologies; the latter technologies should be short-range
in applications where one wants to check that the group members are
physically together. Section 3 describes our actual group size accreditation
method, including the required entities and protocols. The security and
the privacy of our proposal are analyzed in Section 4. In Section 5, we give
a complexity estimation of our approach and describe precomputation
optimizations. Finally, Section 6 summarizes conclusions and future work
ideas.
2 Building Blocks
Our group size accreditation method is based on an identity-based dy-
namic threshold (IBDT ) signature scheme, namely a particular case of
the second protocol proposed in [7].
Threshold signature schemes are commonly based on (t, n)-threshold
secret sharing schemes, such as the ones introduced in [1] and [11], and
they require a minimum number t of participants to produce a valid
signature. Dynamic threshold signature schemes differ from the previous
ones in that the threshold t is not fixed during the setup phase, but is
declared at the moment of signing. Our method takes advantage of this
feature to find out how many users participated in the signature of a
particular message, and consequently how many people form a group.
If one wishes to prove that the signature is not only computed by at
least t participants, but also that these are together in the same place,
the above signature schemes need to be complemented with short-range
communication technologies.
On the other hand, identity-based public key signature schemes, theo-
rized by Shamir in [12] and with the first concrete protocol, based on the
Weil pairing, developed by Boneh et al. in [3], allow public keys pkU to be
arbitrary strings of some length, which we call identities. These strings are
associated with a user U and reflect some aspect of his identity, e.g. his
email address. The corresponding secret key skU is then computed by a
trusted entity, the certification authority (CA), taking as input the user’s
identity and, possibly, some secret information held only by the CA, and
is sent to the user U through some secure channel. Identity-based public
key signature schemes offer a great flexibility in key generation and man-
agement and our method takes advantage of this feature by proposing
a key management scheme that allows preserving the anonymity of the
participants.
Finally, in most group discounts, a fee must be paid after proving the
number of group members, so an anonymous payment method is needed.
Indeed, this method should not reveal additional information about the
group members to the service provider.
2.1 IBDT Signature Scheme
We outline a general identity-based dynamic threshold signature scheme,
namely the second protocol proposed in [7]. Our protocol will be a slight
modification of this general case; we will point out differences when needed.
A general IBDT signature scheme consists of the following five algo-
rithms.
IBDT 1 Setup is a randomized trusted setup algorithm that takes as
input a security parameter λ, a universe of identities ID and an inte-
ger n which is a polynomial function of λ and upper-bounds the possible
thresholds ( i.e. n is the maximum number of users that can participate
in a threshold signature). It outputs a set of public parameters pms and a
master key pair msk and mpk. An execution of this algorithm is denoted
as
(pms,mpk,msk)← Setup (λ,ID, n) .
IBDT 2 Keygen is a key extraction algorithm that takes as input the
public parameters pms, the master key pair msk and mpk, and an identity
id ∈ ID. The output is a private key SKid. An execution of this algorithm
is denoted as
SKid ← Keygen (pms,mpk,msk, id) .
IBDT 3 Sign is a randomized signing algorithm that takes as input the
public parameters pms, the master public key mpk, a user’s secret key
SKid, a message Msg ∈ {0, 1}
∗ and a threshold signing policy Γ = (t, S)
where S ⊂ ID and 1 ≤ t ≤ |S| ≤ n. Note that, in our case, t will be
strictly equal to |S|. Sign outputs a partial signature σid. We denote an
execution of this algorithm as
σid ← Sign (pms,mpk, SKid,Msg, Γ ) .
IBDT 4 Comb is a deterministic signing algorithm which takes as input
the public parameters pms, the master public key mpk, the secret key of
the combiner user SKid, a message Msg, a threshold signing policy Γ =
(t, S) and a specific set St of t partial signatures. Comb outputs a global
signature σ. We denote the action taken by the signing algorithm as
σ ← Comb (pms,mpk, SKid,Msg, Γ, {σid}id∈St) .
IBDT 5 Verify is a deterministic verification algorithm that takes as
input the public parameters pms, a master public key mpk, a message
Msg, a global signature σ and a threshold policy Γ = (t, S). It outputs 1
if the signature is deemed valid and 0 otherwise. We denote an execution
of this algorithm as
b← Verify (pms,mpk,Msg, σ, Γ ) .
For correctness, for any security parameter λ ∈ N, any upper bound
n on the group sizes, any universe ID, any set of public parameters and
master key pair (pms,mpk,msk), and any threshold policy Γ = (t, S)
where 1 ≤ t ≤ |S|, it is required that for
σ = Comb (pms,mpk, SKid,Msg, Γ, {σid}id∈St) ,
Verify (pms,mpk,Msg, σ, Γ ) = 1
whenever the values pms, mpk, msk have been obtained by properly ex-
ecuting the Setup algorithm, |St| ≥ t, and for each id ∈ St, σid ←
Sign(pms,mpk, SKid,Msg, Γ ) and SKid ← Keygen(pms,mpk,msk, id).
2.2 Key Management
The anonymity provided by our accreditation method is a result of our
key generation protocol and management solution. As we stated above,
identity-based public key cryptosystems allow using arbitrary strings as
public keys. In our protocol, every user Ui is given an ordered list of
public keys that depend on some unique identifier of the user, such as
his national identity card number, his phone number, the IMEI number
of his phone or a combination of any of them. We will call this identifier
nUi = d
i
kd
i
k−1 . . . d
i
1
, where dij is the j-th last digit of nUi and typically
ranges from 0 to 9.
To generate the list of public keys from an identifier nUi, we choose a
value ℓ < k and take the ℓ last digits of nUi . This results in a vector of
public keys
PKUi =
{
pk
di
1
1
, . . . , pk
di
ℓ
ℓ
}
,
with every pk
dij
j being an encoding of the digit and its position in nUi , for
example:
pk
dij
j = j || d
i
j ,
where || is the concatenation operation. To illustrate this process, imagine
nUi = 12345678 and ℓ = 4. The resulting public key list would be
PKUi = {18, 27, 36, 45} .
To prove the number of members in a group, the members will choose
a common integer j ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ} so that the j-th public key in their list,
i.e. pk
dij
j , is different for all of them. Then they will perform the required
operations with these public keys and their corresponding private keys.
Assuming that the values of the digits range from 0 to 9, this would
provide anonymity to each of the users, since on average 10% of people
will share the same public key pk
dij
j for some value of j.
Note that this approach limits the size of the groups that can be
certified with our method to a maximum of 10. Moreover, intuition tells
us that the closer the size of the group to this maximum size, the more
difficult it becomes to find a value of j for which each user has a different
public key. The probability that our protocol fails depends on the number
of keys each user is given, ℓ, and the size of the group n; more specifically
for n ≤ 10:
F (ℓ, n) =
(
1−
10(10 − 1) . . . (10 − n+ 1)
10n
)ℓ
,
that is very close to 1 for values of n close to 10.
The limit on the maximum value of n can be increased by assigning
d ≥ 2 digits of nUi to each of the ℓ public keys, instead of just one digit.
By doing this, the maximum value for the size of the groups becomes 10d,
and the probability of failure, for values of n ≤ 10d, is
F (ℓ, n, d) =
(
1−
10d(10d − 1) . . . (10d − n+ 1)
10dn
)ℓ
.
However, the price to be paid for choosing a larger d is a loss of anonymity,
since, if more digits are associated to each public key, less users share the
same public key. For example, for d = 2 a user would share each of his
keys with only 1% of the total number of users.
The service provider will choose ℓ and d depending on maximum num-
ber of keys that a user can store, the maximum allowed group size and
the anonymity level to be guaranteed.
2.3 Anonymous Payment Mechanisms
Group discounts are one of the applications of our method: after proving
the group size, the group members must pay a fee that depends on that
size. If proving the size has been done anonymously, it would be pointless
to subsequently use a non-anonymous payment protocol (such as credit
card, PayPal, etc.).
Hence, we need to use an anonymous payment mechanism along with
our group size accreditation protocol. The simplest option for an anony-
mous payment method is to use cash if the application and the service
provider allow it. Unfortunately, this will not always be the case, and
other payment methods have to be taken into account. Electronic cash
protocols such as [4] are good candidates for this role. Nowadays, Bit-
coin [9] is a well-established electronic currency and, although it is not
anonymous by design [10], it can be a good solution if accompanied by
careful key management policies. Also, extensions of the original protocol
as Zerocoin [8] provide anonymity by design.
For completeness, we propose in this work to use a much simpler ap-
proach, based on prepaid scratch cards that users can buy at stores using
cash (for maximum anonymity). Each such card contain a code Pay.Code
which the service provider will associate with a temporary account hold-
ing a fixed credit specified by the card denomination.
2.4 Communication Technologies
Our accreditation method requires communication among the members
of a group and between the members and some type of verifying device.
If we want to prove not only that a group has a certain number of mem-
bers, but also that these are together, the interactions with the verifying
device must rely on short-range communication technologies, like NFC,
Bluetooth or WiFi.
During the accreditation protocol, the users’ smartphones will be de-
tected in some way by the verifying device and a communication channel
will be established. The requirements and constraints of this process de-
pend on the type of service and verifying devices, but nonetheless it is
desirable that communication establishment be fast and not too cumber-
some to the user.
We propose to use Bluetooth, and in particular Bluetooth Low En-
ergy [2] to communicate with the verifying device. BLE solves some of
the main limitations of traditional Bluetooth, i.e. reduces detection and
bonding times, requires much less work by the user than NFC and has
a shorter range than both Bluetooth and WiFi, which is desirable in a
method like ours. Finally, BLE is implemented by most major smartphone
manufacturers, at least in recent models, unlike NFC.
Regarding communication between the smartphones, any of the three
mentioned technologies, or a combination of them (e.g. Bluetooth pairing
through NFC messages) seems appropriate. The choice is up to the service
provider.
3 Group Size Accreditation Method
A service that implements our accreditation method includes the following
elements:
– A service provider (SP) that publishes a smartphone application AppU
and distributes the necessary public parameters and keys of an IBDT
signature scheme Π to users, after some registration process.
– A smartphone application AppU for each user U which:
• allows computing signatures with Π on behalf of U ;
• allows computing ciphertexts with a public-key encryption scheme
Π ′ selected by SP, under SP’s public key pkSP ;
• can be run on master or slave mode, which affects how AppU par-
ticipates in the accreditation protocol.
• includes some certificate which allows checking the validity of
pkSP ;
• implements some communication protocol, relying in short-range
communication technologies, such as NFC or Bluetooth, to inter-
act with the applications of the rest of the members of the group
and with the verifying devices.
– Prepaid payment scratch cards available at stores. Each card includes
a code Pay.Code that the SP associates to an account with a fixed
credit specified by the card denomination.
– Verifying devices installed at suitable places in the provider’s infras-
tructures which:
• allow verifying signatures with Π;
• hold the SP certificates as well as the keys needed to decrypt
ciphertexts produced with Π ′ under pkSP .
• have short-range communication capabilities and implement some
protocol to communicate with the users’ devices.
– Some method to penalize or prevent the misuse of the system.
The complete accreditation protocol runs as follows:
Protocol 1 System setup protocol.
1. SP chooses the user identifier to be used as nU and appropriate values
for ℓ and d.
2. SP generates the parameters of the IBDT signature scheme Π as per
Algorithm IBDT.Setup;
3. SP generates the parameters of the public-key encryption scheme Π ′.
Protocol 2 Registration protocol.
1. A user U with identifier nU authenticates himself to the service provider,
face-to-face or by some other means. The user receives a PIN code
pinU .
2. The service provider associates to U a vector of public keys of Π,
PKid as described in Section 2.2.
3. The service provider computes the secret keys associated to PKid as
per Algorithm IBDT.Keygen:
SKid =
(
sk
did
1
1
, . . . , sk
did
ℓ
ℓ
)
.
4. The user downloads the smartphone application AppU and, using the
PIN code pinU , completes the registration protocol and receives the
system parameters and keys, as well as the public key pkSP .
Protocol 3 Credit purchase.
1. A user buys a prepaid card for the system, e.g. a scratch card, from a
store.
2. The card includes some code Pay.Code which has to be introduced in
the smartphone application.
Protocol 4 Group setup protocol.
1. Some user U∗, among the group of users U1, . . . , Ut who want to use
the service, takes the leading role. This user will be responsible for most
of the communication with the verifying device. U∗ sets his smart-
phone application to run in master mode and the others set it to work
in slave mode.
2. The users agree on a value j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , ℓ} such that the value of the
j-th public key in PKid is different for every user.
Protocol 5 Group size accreditation protocol.
1. A verifying device detects the users’ devices and sends them a unique
time-stamped ticket T that may include a description of the service
conditions and options.
2. Each user Ui runs Algorithm IBDT.Sign to compute a partial signature
with Π under his secret key sk
dij
j on message
Msg =
〈
T || pk
d1j
j || . . . || pk
dtj
j
〉
,
for the threshold predicate Γ = (t, {pk
d1j
j , . . . , pk
dtj
j }). It sends the re-
sulting partial signature σi to U
∗.
3. U∗ receives (σ1, . . . , σt) and runs Algorithm IBDT.Comb to combine
these signatures and output a final signature σ on behalf of U1, . . . , Ut.
U∗ sends to the verifying device
Msg′ = 〈Msg, σ〉 .
4. The verifying device checks the validity of the signature by running
IBDT.Verify(Msg, σ, pk
d1j
j || . . . ||pk
dtj
j , t).
Note that this signature will only be valid if all users U1, . . . , Ut have
collaborated in computing it, and thus it proves that the group of users
is composed of at least t people. If the signature is not valid, the group
will be penalized in an application-dependent way, e.g. with access de-
nial, group discount denial, etc. Otherwise, the service provider grants
access to the group of users and tells the group the amount amountt
they have to pay depending on the group size.
Protocol 6 Payment.
1. Each group member U in the (sub)set P of group members who want to
collaborate in paying the bill sends to the verifying device via Bluetooth
or WiFi his payment code encrypted under SP’s public key:
CU = EncpkSP (T||Pay.CodeU ),
where Pay.CodeU is the code which user U obtained from a prepaid
scratch card and where Enc is the public-key encryption algorithm of
scheme Π ′.
2. The verifying device decrypts the ciphertexts {CU : U ∈ P} to obtain
the payment codes of the users in P .
3. The verifying device substracts the quantity amountt divided by the
cardinal of P to the accounts associated with the received payment
codes.
4 Security and Privacy Analysis
Security and privacy are offered by design in our proposal:
– The chosen IBDT scheme ensures unforgeability of signatures under
chosen message attacks even when an attacker can choose arbitrarily
the threshold signing policy. In this case, this means that, for any
t ≥ 2, no group of less than t buyers is able to deceive the service
provider by producing a threshold signature with threshold t. Com-
plete security proofs can be found in the original paper [7].
– No more than the pseudonyms and the number of participants of
a group is revealed to the service provider during the execution of
the protocol. Buyer anonymity is guaranteed by the key management
scheme described in Section 2.2 within the community of buyers shar-
ing the same public key. For example, if each public key is associated
to a combination of d decimal digits, then on average this public key
is shared by a community containing 10−d×100% of the total number
of users.
– When payment is completely anonymous, whatever anonymity level
achieved by key management is preserved after payment. For our given
method, this is ensured when a given Pay.Code cannot be linked to a
specific buyer. This can be achieved, for example, if the scratch card
containing the Pay.Code is purchased using cash.
5 Performance Analysis
Our group size accreditation method is to be run by service providers,
specialized verifying devices and the users’ smartphones. Therefore, it is
important that the computations of the underlying cryptographic proto-
col be as fast as possible, especially the algorithms that are executed by
the smartphones, which have limited computational capabilities and rely
on batteries.
In this section, we analyze the performance of the underlying IBDT
signature scheme. This scheme is a pairing-based cryptographic proto-
col and as such, the required operations are performed in elliptic curve
groups. We analyze its performance by counting the number of point
multiplications, point exponentiations and pairings, which are the most
costly operations.
Table 1 shows the number of these operations for each of the al-
gorithms in the IBDT signature scheme. The number of operations is
counted as a function of the maximum number of possible participants in
a signature, n, and the size of the signing group t. As we stated previously,
t ≤ n.
Table 1. Operations required per algorithm
Multiplications Exponentiations Pairings
Setup 0 n+ 4 1
Keygen 2n 4n 0
Sign 2n+ 6 2n+ 5 0
Comb 2n− t+ 1 2n− t 0
Verify n+ 2 n+ 1 4
Note that the Sign and Comb algorithms, that are intended to be ex-
ecuted in the users’ smartphones during the group size accreditation
protocol (5), present what seems to be quite a high number of opera-
tions. This might be a problem if the devices in which these algorithms
are to be executed do not have enough computational power. Moreover,
these two algorithms should precisely be most efficient, since they are
run most often, and possibly with time constraints. Therefore, it would
be interesting if we could precompute some of their operations.
The Sign algorithm is a probabilistic protocol, that is, it has some
random values in it that have to be refreshed each time it is executed.
This limits the amount of operations in the algorithm that can be pre-
computed. On the other hand, most of the operations depend on static
values, e.g. keys and threshold policies Γ . Threshold policies contain the
number of signers that will participate in a signature and their public
keys. We assume that groups of users will be quite stable, i.e. users will
generally use services together with the same group members, or at least
with a limited set of different groups. We can exploit this assumption by
precomputing operations that only depend on static values and threshold
policies.
The Comb algorithm obviously depends on the output of Sign, but it is
a deterministic algorithm and some of its operations depend on static val-
ues and also on the threshold policies. Therefore, by the same assumption
as before, we can precompute some of the operations.
These precomputations will divide the Sign and Comb algorithms in
two phases each, one for precomputing values, which will be executed dur-
ing the group setup protocol (4), and the other one performed during
the group size accreditation protocol (5). The resulting number of
operations in each of these phases is shown in Table 2.
Table 2. Precomputed and non-precomputed operations of the Sign and Comb algo-
rithms (PC stands for precomputed)
Multiplications Exponentiations Pairings
Sign PC 2n+ 2 2n+ 1 0
FastSign 2 4 0
Comb PC 2n− 2t 2n− 2t 0
FastComb 3t+ 1 3t 0
6 Conclusions and Future Work
We have presented a privacy-preserving mechanism for group discounts.
The method is built upon an IBDT signature scheme, a concrete key
generation and management solution, short-range communication tech-
nologies and anonymous payment mechanisms. Our complexity analysis
and initial tests show that the method is usable in practice.
Future work will consist of implementing the protocol, testing it and
developing a generic app for privacy-preserving group discounts that can
be easily customized for specific applications.
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